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Matrimonial Bonds: Slavery and Divorce
in Nineteenth-Century America
ELIZABETH B. CLARK

[I]n the covenant of marriage, [woman] is compelle
dience to her husband, he becoming, to all intents
master-the law giving him power to deprive her o

administer chastisement. He has so framed the law of divorce ... as to

be wholly regardless of the happiness of women-the law, in all cases,
going upon a false supposition of the supremacy of man, and giving all
power into his hands.'
As early as 1848, in the first public meeting on woman's rights, feminists

raised the touchy issues of women's marital subjugation and divorce.
They complained that the laws of marriage and divorce were framed
for the benefit of men and to entrap women within the oppressive
institution of marriage. Another controversial claim made at Seneca

Falls-that to the ballot-went on to become the great organizing
principle for women's campaigns for legal and political reform. But
despite the bold beginning, divorce remained a complex and divisive
issue for feminists throughout the century. Although legislatures in
most states in the mid-nineteenth century were systematically liberalizing divorce laws, they could not lift the social stigma attached to it.2
Fearful of being branded as anti-marriage or anti-family, or believing

in the permanency of marriage, many feminists spoke of divorce

reluctantly, and never used their formidable organizing skills to launch
a full-scale assault on laws restricting the dissolution of marriage.
Elizabeth Cady Stanton stood as the great exception to this rule. An

early and ardent champion of liberal divorce, her arguments were
highly influential in the development of nineteenth-century feminist
theory.3 A few feminists followed Stanton whole-heartedly, some agreed
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with her in part, still others were shocked at her advocacy of measures
they felt would tend toward the disruption of marriage and the family.

Yet even for those feminists who resisted her conclusions, the analysis
of marriage she offered-"from covenant to contract" could have been

her rallying cry-was transformative. Despite its mixed reception,
Stanton's theory of divorce and family relations helped to shape
nineteenth-century American attitudes toward marriage.
Stanton's theory of divorce became as well a critical platform for
her maturing theory of rights, which was far more in tune with both
mainstream feminist and liberal thought of her day than were her ideas

about divorce. Stanton's work, emphasizing the ultimate "right" to
free oneself from obligations that had become unwanted bonds, paved
the way for a liberal feminist theory that rested on the autonomy of
the individual. She helped to promote both the growth of a family law
based on a contractual theory of relations and a view of politics that
deemed the rights of individuals paramount. In Stanton's work, personal
autonomy began to constitute the individual's citizenship in a way that
has become a dominant motif in American life.

Stanton's vision of individual rights drew heavily on ideas of slavery
and freedom, and the debate over their definitions that raged in postCivil War America. Stanton's adoption of the radical extremes of
freedom and slavery to describe the condition of women has left a
mixed legacy. The most brilliant and dynamic feminist theorist of her
day, she helped forge a language of individual liberty that acted as a
catalyst for social change.4 Nevertheless, the adoption of the slavery

paradigm to describe marriage narrowed Stanton's perceptions of
women's condition and dictated an appeal to a specific sort of legal

remedy that both shaped and limited feminist goals during the nineteenth century.

Divorce in the Antebellum Era

In January of 1853, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, acting on behalf of the
New York State Woman's Temperance Society, offered a ten-dollar
prize for the best essay entitled "The Duty of the Drunkard's Wife,"
in the women's temperance newspaper Lily. The readers of the Lily,
themselves a progressive group, rose to the challenge.5 Well coached,
all took the position that Stanton and Susan B. Anthony had been
urging in the Lily's columns in the preceding months: that wives of
chronic inebriates had a duty to seek a separation, to sever the conjuga
relationship, so as not to be the agent of breeding a drunkard's children.

Matrimonial Bonds

27

The contestants, however, chose in the end to resolve their characters'
problems through separation, death, or desertion; none broached the
subject of legal divorce. Half-measures never satisfied Stanton, and for
her these analyses fell short: The Lily contains no record of the prize
being awarded.

The liberalization of divorce laws was by no means foreordained.
Even progressive minds feared the path to easy divorce, disagreeing
about its significance, its desirability, and its consequences. Antebellum
reformers recognized the need for legal separation or divorce most
consistently in the case of the chronically drunken husband. Under
these circumstances, a virtually unanimous consensus prevailed that
the law must somehow intervene. The Lily, whose subject matter ranged

between the poles of temperance and women's rights, rendered in
particularly lurid tones the plight of the battered mother bound for life

to a "moral monster-[a] vulgar, gross, imbruted nature."6 Indeed,
feminists who remained deeply committed to the Christian ideal of

lifelong marriage agreed on the need for the equivalent of a legal
separation, contingent upon reforms in the law of marital property to
safeguard women's rights.
Fueled by the broader reform agitation over family law in the 1850s,
the debate on divorce extended beyond feminist circles. In the early
1850s, the editor of the New York Tribune, Horace Greeley, engaged
the anarchist and free lover Stephen Pearl Andrews and the Boston
Swedenborgian Henry James, Sr., in an extended and highly publicized
debate over the ongoing liberalization of divorce laws. In 1860, Greeley
took up his cudgel again, this time against Robert Dale Owen, son of
communitarian Robert Owen.7 Not just divorce but the function of
family law was at stake in these debates. Greeley served as the linchpin,
or perhaps the lightning rod, articulating a strain of thought that held
that family law existed to coerce "moral" or socially desirable behavior.
He valued the maintenance of the family as a social unit well above
any measure of personal or erotic satisfaction and delighted in pointing
out that the law warned people to exercise caution in contracting a
lifelong bond. If they misjudged the case, the pain and penalty were
theirs. "To the libertine, the egoist, the selfish, sensual seeker of personal

and present enjoyment at whatever cost to others, the indissolubility
of marriage is an obstacle, a restraint, a terror: and God forbid that it
should ever cease to be!"8 That the indecisive, the deluded, the trusting,
and the optimistic got caught in this trap as well was of little concern
to Horace Greeley.
An alternate view, put forth most forcefully by Andrews and Owen,
argued that family law should enable free choice and facilitate human
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relations in a way that approximated the laissez-faire model of economic
regulation. Stanton sympathized with Owen and Andrews, assailing
Greeley's view of law as Draconian and old fashioned.9 For all three,
the emphasis on human will mandated a new view of law, one more
enabling than coercive. They retained law within their social program,
but as the servant and not the master: "Marriage itself, like the Sabbath,

was made for man; not man for marriage."'0 A law that forced the
continuation of an unhappy relation obstructed its purpose of securing
happiness, and should be changed. "There is no absolute right or wrong
about this matter of divorce; but that it may properly vary in its details
at different stages of civilization."'1

Early nineteenth-century radicals and communitarians such as Robert
Owen and Frances Wright had constructed the groundwork for such
claims well before the meeting at Seneca Falls: however controversial
and heretical their teachings remained, they had received a wide public
airing.'2 But although this radical tradition was at hand, most early
feminists eschewed it. An emphasis on liberty, on the affective nature

of the marriage bond, and on the need for divorce to ensure the
happiness of the individual were strikingly absent from early feminist
discourse. Perhaps with the exception of Stanton-a major exceptionthey did not thrill to the "right" to dissolve the marriage bond and
seek their romantic fortunes elsewhere. Rather, those who first approved

of divorce saw it as self-defense, a measure of last resort to counter
physical violence leveled at women by drunken and abusive husbands.
Before the Civil War, feminist arguments for divorce were not made
in terms of an abstract right to individual liberty, but in more pragmatic

terms, the most fundamental being the instinct for self-preservation.
Story after story in women's papers such as the Lily and the Una, and
in other works both fictional and factual, stressed the combined burdens
of overwork and brutal treatment that could result in insanity or death

for wives and mothers. Tales of marital violence were so frequent and

widely known that one child-probably the son of reformers-grew
up thinking of murder as a common contingency of marriage.'3
Antebellum feminists most often invoked duties rather than rights
as justification for divorce, particularly the mother's duty to children.

Many women initially feared crossing the border into the land of
absolute rights-bearers, and even Stanton-whose views were, as always,
more radical-dwelt heavily on maternal obligation rather than rights
in exhorting women to recognize the need for full and free divorce in

cases of chronic inebriation.'4 The physical safety of a drunkard's

children was at issue as well as that of their mother; liberal feminists
stressed her duty to remove them to a safer environment.
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The obligation to protect extended beyond living children to children
unborn, and it became the basis of antebellum feminists' arguments
for refusing husbands their "rights" in the marriage bed. Stanton relied

heavily on what Linda Gordon has described as a folk wisdom of

eugenics, preaching widely on the poor genetic harvest of unwilling
unions.'5 Exploiting the nineteenth-century passion for statistics, she
calculated that of the nearly 1300 idiots in Massachusetts, between
1110 and 1200 had been born of alcoholic parents, and urged women
to sever immediately conjugal relations with husbands who drank:
"The unspeakable misery of looking a laughing idiot in the face and
calling him 'my son' is known but to the mother's heart -the drunkard's
wife."'6 Stanton's and Anthony's scientific Calvinism stressed the heritability of sin and preached that "[N]o woman should consent to be
the wife of a drunkard because she may be the medium of stamping
new forms of immortality on his gross, carnal nature...." At one New
York Women's State Temperance Convention it was resolved that "it
is a sin for any woman to consent to entail on innocent beings the
curse and degradation that are the certain heritage of the Drunkard's
offspring.. ."'7 Recognizing that abandoning the marriage bed was a
painful and audacious step, Stanton counseled her readers that God in
his benevolence never intended such a travesty of human happiness as
a virtuous woman tied for life to a "loathsome, putrid carcass."'8
The brutalized wife presented the most vivid and compelling case
for divorce, but a higher-minded strain of thought ran through antebellum divorce arguments as well. One of the abolitionists' strongest
arguments was that slavery illegitimately interposed human authority
between the individual and God, thwarting that person's growth and
development according to God's plan. The antebellum protest against

the usurpation of God's authority took on new form in decrying

marriage as subsuming the individuality of one person to the will of
another. For liberal Protestants in full revolt against both the theology
and political implications of Calvinist orthodoxy, the binding of the

human will was both a crime and a sin, in marriage as elsewhere.
Stanton and fellow feminist Antoinette Brown Blackwell adopted and
embroidered this argument, using it to challenge the husband's authority.19 Stanton asked: "[H]ow can [woman] subscribe to a theology
which makes her the conscious victim of another's will, forever subject
to the triple bondage of man, priest, and the law... ? How can she
endure our present marriage relations by which woman's life, health,
and happiness are held so cheap that she herself feels that God has
given her no charter of rights, no individuality of her own?"20
Obedience to God was a far easier principle for mainstream feminists
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to accept than one of individual happiness through severing the marital
bond. The liberal Protestant notion of a newly benevolent God with

designs for each individual's happiness provided Stanton with an
argument in favor of divorce that was more acceptable to contemporaries in the 1850s. Stanton thus introduced into the divorce debate-

embedded in a theory of divine will and human duty-the ideas of
individual happiness and the importance of personal growth, concepts
that she would later develop into claims for personal autonomy.

Marriage and Slavery in the Post-War Period
In the post-Civil War period, the rhetoric of divorce changed dramatically as the language of rights replaced that of duty to God or
children. For feminists, caught up in the great public debates of the
post-war period, the wrongs of brutalized wives served as a catalyst for
early consciousness of individual rights: "[it is] difficult to depict the
woes of the drunkard's wife... without saying that her rights have
been recklessly invaded, and wrongfully withheld."2 Earlier, divorce
had been understood as an act of self-defense; now it became an issue
of personal liberty. The idea of the right to one's body and to one's
labor was a critical tenet of post-war political theory; liberal feminists
adapted this "rights" definition to their own ends.
Slavery had ended, but slavery/freedom became the ruling paradigm
through which liberal feminists conceived and developed their vision
of rights within marriage. The analogy between marriage and slavery
was natural and powerful, the conclusion inescapable: "Did the wives
of all drunkards know that they have no master but God-that they
are their own, and not the property of man-that woman is endowed
with the same wants and capacities, and entitled to the same rights

and privileges with him, they would not long wear the yoke of
slavery. .. 22
Feminists' reliance on slavery imagery to express the plight of women
grew naturally from the early ties with the abolitionist movement. The
fledgling pre-Civil War woman's rights movement was ignited and
fueled by women whose involvement in the anti-slavery movement
had convinced them that arguments from natural rights and human
dignity applied equally to women. Early feminists had labeled their
own conditions as slavery, referring largely to the civil wrongs of
coverture and disfranchisement. The direct analogy between slavery
and marriage appeared less frequently: Despite criticisms of its legal
trappings, the institution of marriage itself was accorded great deference.
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After the war, though, liberal feminists' use of slavery imagery took

on a new directness, serving to describe the actual physical and

emotional relations between husband and wife. Slavery imagery gained

dominance and new meaning, and bondage became the metaphor of
choice for pro-divorce feminists. Marriage itself had not become significantly more oppressive in those few years. Rather, the Emancipation
Proclamation and the subsequent constitutional amendments offered
a compelling new model for the articulation of grievances, grievances
that in the slave's case had already been addressed with a suggestive
array of constitutional rights and remedies. During the Civil War, antislavery ideology had developed into a political force invoking newly
powerful models of government intervention to redress slavery's wrongs.

In many respects, anti-slavery rhetoric was a more powerful political
tool after the war precisely because of its new legal status. For antebellum

reformers, slavery had held the status of a sin, a widespread corrupt
practice that had offended notions of natural and divine law. By the
late 1860s, enslavement had essentially become a crime, which human
law outlawed and whose consequences human law sought to redress.
The woman's rights movement's reliance on the mechanisms of human
law grew reciprocally with the government's administration of equal
protection standards through statutes and constitutional amendments.
With feminist theory newly oriented toward legislative and policy goals,

the franchise foremost among them, the slavery paradigm took on a
new value as a language of political opposition.23
In gross terms, middle-class women who compared themselves to
bondswomen may seem melodramatic and self-aggrandizing. But feminists felt themselves in both acute physical and spiritual bondage. The
slavery/freedom dichotomy helped articulate common apprehensions
of the illegitimacy of male and masterly authority, as well as women's
genuine outrage at a marital servitude that many felt keenly was as
degrading as actual bondage. In describing bad marriages, women spoke
of being crushed, dwarfed, broken, crippled-a language of assaults
on the body that resonated wildly in the immediate aftermath of the
slavery contest. Stories abounded of wives who pictured themselves as
"legalized slaves" to "masters" who meted out brutal treatment unchecked and unprovoked. An article in the Revolution entitled "The
Slavery of Woman" offered a standard catalog of seductions, rapes, and
assaults to which women had been subjected. One writer suggested, in
the absence of anyone to raise a cry of "murder," that "we do it for
ourselves, by stepping into the footprints of Garrison."24

For those women who were fortunate enough to escape actual
violence, codes and customs appeared to create manacles no less
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confining for being based on law, habit, and public sentiment. Even
the ostensibly autonomous female body was encumbered by a scaffolding of hoops, buttons, and stays. One mother asked in defense of
the Bloomer costume, "ought we, my child, to be enslaved by anything
that cramps the freedom of the soul... ?"25 Stanton eloquently declared
that "[O]ur evolution thus far is but a struggle to stretch ourselves
while bound hand and foot, to fly with clipped wings, to breathe with
an anesthetic held to mouth and nose... the oneness of man and

woman [is] a oneness that makes woman a slave."26 Women wrote
read books with titles such as Hedged In, Forced Vows, and Fetter
for Life, or; Lord and Master27
Women's writing also made frequent literary use of the escape sc
inspired by fugitives from the South. Diatribes against the laws o
parental custody were laden with descriptions that drew on the E
story from Uncle Tom's Cabin, the slave mother escaping with he
child, hounds baying at her heels. Such mothers, escaping their op
pressive husbands, asked, "but he will follow me, will traduce me, a
take my baby away from me, and the law won't give me my freed
will it?"28

This sentimentalized presentation of marital enslavement and it

consequences among all classes of society is portrayed vividly in Fettered
for Life, or, Lord and Master, written in 1874 by the prominent suffra

and Stanton-sympathizer, Lillie Devereaux Blake. Despite its traditio
format, the novel's moral was unconventional. The mortality rate f

the novel's female characters is improbably high, and the auth

unsubtly conveys her message that "man-marriage," or the comm

model of male domination, takes a toll on women. Marital slav

plays itself out differently for each class, however, in a way that shows
the growing recognition of class distinctions in feminist political analys

Antebellum divorce and anti-marriage rhetoric had pictured all wom
as potential victims of a husband's drunken violence without acknow
edging hurts or rights special to any group. But in Fettered for Lif

women of different classes are at risk in different ways, and follow ou

particular patterns in their marriages.

The novel's working-class female characters-Biddy, Rhoda, M

Blodgett-are especially vulnerable to physical abuse and have all be
victimized by overt male brutality: seduced and abandoned like Rho

or like Biddy brought to death's door by an abusive spouse. Mr

Blodgett, whose marriage to an underworld figure we follow throughou

the narrative, remains a loving and subservient mate to a small-ti
criminal who finally kicks her to death in a drunken frenzy toward
end of the novel.
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By contrast, the genteel and middle-class Mrs. Moulder, overworked
mother of three, suffers a more subtle oppression at the hands of a
grumpy and domineering newspaper editor, who shreds her dreams of
a more cultivated life with his mundane tyrannies rather than his fists.

Violence here is displaced onto her pet canary, which Mr. Moulder
kills with a thoughtless (but significant) blow while trying to return it
to its cage. Mrs. Moulder, undone by the excitement, suffers a miscarriage and sinks into physical decline.
Harsh as these scenarios are, Blake saves the most vivid slave imagery
for the case of Flora, wealthy daughter of a prominent businessman
and best friend of the heroine. Clearly the gay, innocent, and talented
Flora represents for Blake the most compelling and sympathetic case,
one of "pure" enslavement without actual physical violence or demand.
While relying heavily on images of male violence, middle-class feminists
admitted that, in their understanding, women like themselves experienced less abuse than working-class women, for whom marital violence

was often a way of life.29 While including domestic violence as an
important part of their critique, many liberal feminists began to stress
the suffering of the spirit above the suffering of the body as the true
enslavement. The story of Flora illustrates how the slavery metaphor
took on new meaning in their hands, as they focused more and more
on the stifling of the will, talents, and independence as the most serious
consequences of women's bondage.
Descriptions of the courtship of Flora and the worldly, wealthy roue
who pursues her are shot through with the language of mastery. For
months Flora resist LeRoy's overtures, fearing to become his "slave
for life." Finally catching her unawares one night on the veranda, he
forces a kiss on her, murmuring "my sweet trembling little prisoner,

you are fairly caught. Give me your promise." In the face of his
"irresistable will," "forceful eyes," "detaining hands," Flora "remained
passive, unable to escape." After the kiss, "she was no longer free, no

longer belonged to herself, she had received a master, and been
compelled to submit to the symbol of his power....'I have passed
under the yoke,' she thought, 'I am a slave.' " Thwarted in her attempt
to escape, Flora continues to struggle weakly throughout the marriage
ceremony, but "the iron clasp held her fast," and the vows were taken.30

Predictably, the marriage is an unhappy one: LeRoy forbids Flora to
walk alone, see old friends, or follow her own pursuits. In defiance she

takes up her writing again, and out of her anguish produces an
extraordinary poem, which she secretly sends off for publication.

LeRoy's anger at her independence precipitates a crisis and Flora's
decline. On her deathbed she tells him that she can only be well again
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if he will lift his ban on the publication of her works; he refuses.31 Her

dying words to him are "Remember that women, as well as men, need
an occupation for their energies, and marriage without love is worse

than death.... There is light above my head-light and freedom!"32
Fettered for Life is emblematic of much liberal feminist thought,
illustrating how the problem of wasted talents and the quest for
professional opportunity-subjects with particularly middle-class appeal-became increasingly intertwined with the anti-slavery rhetoric
of the marriage critique.33 The right to hold a job, to pursue a career
or profession, came to be seen as a critical part of woman's emancipation.

Marriage and Freedom of Contract
Slavery's antithesis in nineteenth-century political discourse was
freedom, and feminists' equation of marriage and slavery compelled
their audiences to contemplate divorce through its obvious analogy,
emancipation. The traditional marriage was undergoing its own Reconstruction. As Stanton declared, the growing number of divorces was
not a sign of declining morals, but exactly the opposite: "Woman is in
a transition period from slavery to freedom, and she will not accept
the conditions of family life that she has heretofore meekly observed."34

According to the feminist agenda, what did freedom or emancipation
entail for the married woman? In the view of a growing number of
liberal feminists led by Stanton, its most important tenets were selfownership within marriage and a right to divorce if the marriage became

degrading.

Linda Gordon and other historians of women have talked about

"self-ownership" as a form of birth control ("voluntary motherhood"
and as a radical assertion of sexual autonomy within marriage, both
critical parts of nineteenth-century feminists' claims.35 The term itself-

clearly predicated on slavery and coined to signify its literal opposite
drew on both abolitionist and free-love traditions. As Gordon has

pointed out in her chapter on "Voluntary Motherhood," despite pr
found disagreement on other scores, a wide range of women activis
including free lovers, liberal feminists, and the more conserva
Christian suffragists of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union

concurred that married women were entitled to choose or refuse sex

at will, according to their own desires and their wish to conceive. Thus,
the "right to her own person" became a key feminist concept, language
with little resonance in the earlier period.36 Stantonians claimed that
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next to self-ownership, which should "determine the future of the race,"

suffrage represented only a "simple question of political privilege."37
In a larger sense, Stanton and her sympathizers, in common with
Victoria Woodhull, were attempting to restructure the idea of "right"
to eliminate "obligation" altogether, broadly privileging the right to be
free of obligation above the right to insist on the performance of a
legal or contractual duty. They declared that "woman's degradation is
in man's idea of his sexual rights." Placing woman's right to refuse
above man's need for sexual relations, they denied that there was any
male right at all, or any corresponding wifely duty.38 Drawing on the
romantic anti-institutionalism of antebellum reform, liberal feminists

transposed that language into an endorsement of voluntarism and
radical personal autonomy. They decried the coercion of "marriage as
a compulsory bond enforced by law and rendered perpetual by that
means" and labeled every action and every relation that resulted from
external coercion inherently corrupt.39
Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly took this road farther than even
Stanton and Anthony did. An article with the suggestive title "Marriage

Versus Freedom," whose author claimed Stanton's and Anthony's

blessing on her views, declared that "[F]reedom is the only right worth
striving for... if, indeed, there are any other rights outside of and apart

from personal freedom." She dismissed critics' objections that mutual

obligations rendered complete personal freedom impossible: "[N]o
person has any right to assume, to impose, such dependence on another
as will make the exercise of that other's free will a source of unhappiness.

Neither single nor mutual obligations should extend any further than
the purest free will prompts; and then they are not obligations at all,

but favors instead...."40

Although the writers for Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly went beyond
most mainstream feminists in their emphasis on individual liberty,
Stanton herself was in complete sympathy with their claims. She even
publicly defended the position of mistress over that of wife on the
grounds that it was a voluntary relationship and not legal bondage.41
This inherent privileging of a right to be free of obligations over any
right to exact obligations impugned not just the marital bond, but an
older structure that rested on reciprocal concepts of rights and duties:
rights and obligations derived from status, by which the law described
the roles and relationships of pairs like master-slave, husband-wife,
parent-child. The rights that liberal feminists asserted-the right to
vote, to own property, and to act as guardians of their own childrenworked to destroy some of the rights formerly vested in men, but put
no one under any continuing obligation, and engaged no one in any
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reciprocal relationship. Liberal feminists repeatedly expressed their legal

strategy as an attempt to lift laws that restrained and coerced, rather
than as a way to obligate or coerce others. In the grand scheme, they
sought "[F]reedom, freedom from all unnecessary entanglements and
concessions, freedom from binding obligations involving impossibilities,
freedom to repair mistakes, to express the manifoldness of our own
natures, and to progress on, to advance to higher planes of development."42 Such radical autonomy left little room for ties. In their desire
for freedom, in that binary understanding of slavery and freedom,
which construed any customary or legal bond as making one unfree,
liberal feminists predicated their claims on the assertion that "the laws

of the individual sovereignty of women are more sacred than any

human tie."43

In this attempt to reconstruct the nature of obligation, liberal feminists

moved naturally toward legal concepts. Seeking to recast the marriage
relationship on more nearly equal terms, they groped for language that
could express their vision in ways harmonious with mainstream thought.

Contract was an obvious choice. The contractual ideal was pervasive
in nineteenth-century society, so much so that to speak of feminists
invoking contract as a "strategy" is misleading; it was the common
coin of intellectual life, spreading far beyond its legal bounds to influence

notions of reciprocity, obligation, and personal and business relations.
Use of the slavery paradigm brought the issue of freedom of contract

into play: In effect, the condition of slavery had less to do with

disfranchisement than with a slave's more immediate inability to sever

old work ties and form new ones and to bargain for a fair wagepowers that acquired almost mystical importance in the years around

the Civil War. In addition to its more general civil status, then,

"freedom" took on a narrower definition in the ability to make and
break agreements at will.44 Contract provided women both with a
theory of equal and reciprocal duties within an ongoing relation and
also with a model for breaking that relation when the bargain went
sour.

In addition to seeking justification for their interpretations of the
marriage obligation in the law of contract, liberal feminists invoked
God in their support as the first author of the dissoluble marriage
contract. Stanton repeatedly pointed out, in her voluminous writings
and far-flung speaking tours, that any legal bond that condemned one
party to an unhappy and degraded existence violated God's own first
plan for human happiness; the legal bond of marriage, then, must give
way to God's most sacred decree, reinterpreted by his zealous female
apostles in America as "what God had not joined together, let man
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put asunder.45 According to Stanton, God's own laws now required
of human beings that, rather than a sacramental or covenant theory
of marriage relations, they subscribe to a theory of marital contract,
with its inherent destructability. No bond in this new world could be
irrevocably formed, for "any constitution, compact, or covenant between human beings, that failed to promote human happiness, could
not... be of any force or authority; and it would be not only a right,
but a duty, to abolish it."4
For Stanton, the concept of contract represented largely the deregulation of marriage, the noninterference of church and state in the
private realm. It is true that feminists in the 1850s were on the cusp
of change: Initially repudiating human regulation as inimical to selfgovernment, women activists were beginning to see law as a tool that
could be manipulated for their own ends. But it was the enabling rather
than the enforcing power of law that appealed to feminists who sought
to reform the marriage contract. Their view of the law of contract,
although oversimplified, held that "all contracts, covenants, agreements,
and partnerships are left wholly at the discretion of the parties."47
Stanton did give some credence to the power of government to
regulate the initial formation of contracts, including marriage. Citing

the need for safeguards like minimum age, competence, and full
disclosure, she encouraged legislators to remedy "the absence of form
and dignity in the marriage contract which is unknown in any other
civilized nation" with a strict set of prior conditions.48 But this list also
reads as a set of contractual defenses, setting out grounds on which
she thought divorce should be more easily granted or marriages annulled. Stanton pointed out that in other civil contracts, failure to
comply with the conditions of entrance "vitiates the contract, and it
is annulled by the mutual agreement of both parties. But in the marriage
contract, which the state allows to be formed so thoughtlessly, ignorantly,

irreverently, the parties have no control whatever, though ofttimes in
its formation and continuance all laws of decency and common sense
are at defiance... "49 Stanton sought tough entry and easy exit, but
felt that stricter regulation of the creation of a marriage contract would

cut down on failed marriages.
The notion of free contract served as a blueprint for remodeling the
marriage relationship as well as for ending it. A part of the liberal
project on marriage entailed demystifying it by applying to it the
everyday terms of bargain and exchange, which governed arms-length
agreements for services. Feminists used contractual analogies to describe
faithful adherence to their marital terms, despite men's repeated violations of their own. Many men refused to perform their own obligations
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while insisting that women meet theirs, thus moving the agreement
from the realm of contract into slavery.50 Several different writers for

the Revolution in particular employed the language of employment
relations and free labor to urge woman's more equal participation in
"the marital partnership," lest the common imbalance "involve the
bank of matrimony in hopeless bankruptcy."5 The Revolution's boosting
of free labor and free trade was not purchased with George Francis
Train's money, but served as an integral part of a system of thought

in which external compulsion was synonymous with imbalance or

disfunction.52

The author of an unattributed four-part series of articles entitled
"The Husband of Today" seems to have taken a leaf from the debate
over the ownership of the craftsman's tools when she complains that
the wife has "no legal right to that home which she is dutifully expected

to beautify and make pleasant" because man has the "rightful ownership
of all the goods and chattels of the family," rendering the wife little
more than a slave. Like any other artisan, woman claimed more control
of the workplace and of her "tools." When houses were designed by
men, they misplaced the pantries and the sinks, little understanding
the uses to which such objects were put: "The wife has, doubtless, good
reason for the hot fire, the open draught, the large wash ... she doubtless

knows (her job) better than her husband," whose ignorant "sole
management" only puts him in the category of "officious intermeddler."

Sharply criticizing the profit motive, which made men unwilling to
invest capital in the home, the author cites many women who "complained in the roundest terms, in the bitterest Saxon, that they were
the drudges, the household slaves of money-getting husbands, who,
provided they could lay by year after year money (one lady said $3,000)
of profits, are either indifferent to, or do not appreciate, the cares,
sorrows, and overtoil of their wives... with all the heavy claims of
maternity, being made to work full up to the mark, like the man daylaborer... a dreary slavery in the free states." Women's rights included
the right "to herself, to the use of all the powers and facilities God has
given her, and the rights to the profits of her labor....53

Visions of the Family

This vision of women's marital enslavement and emancipation
through the recasting of marriage as a contract dissoluble at willlargely Stanton's vision-remained highly controversial within feminism itself, as well as attracting bitter criticism and attacks from
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outside. Opponents claimed that liberal reformers' programs threatened
the nuclear family, and, in fact, these reformers did have a distinctive
agenda with regard to the family's role and function. Within the larger
debate, Greeley, as usual, staked out the orthodox position with his
contention that the family's main function was, as the social agent of
breeding, to provide for the training and education of children. This
rationale bolstered his argument that the importance of lifelong marriage

outweighed the happiness of the individual parties, because it best
served the goals of stability and social order.
Liberal feminists emphatically rejected this utilitarian view, insisting

that motherhood was simply one incident of womanhood, not its
defining parameter.54 Reacting against attempts to shame women back
into the home with stories of neglected children and motherly duty,
they downgraded the maternal bond from the primary place it held in
the nineteenth century to stand as only one of many other rights and
obligations that made up female life, foremost among them the right

to self. The contract model of marital relations could not easily be
fitted to the parent-child relationship, but in rejecting the covenant
model of permanent bonds, liberal feminists, with both intellectual and
emotional conviction, sought to loosen their maternal ties by denying
the aspect of demand or duty. Stanton's hypersensitivity to forced
bonds led her to class all bodily obligations as feudal in nature; the
law of perpetual physical union was an ancient horror from "those

dark periods when marriage was held by the greatest doctors and priests
of the church to be a work of the flesh only."55

Such thoughts contributed to the accurate impression of many of
the movement's critics that woman's rights, at least as Stanton envisioned them, would radically alter the marriage relationship. Indeed,
the essence of that traditional bond would have been changed by the
creed that held, "the moment any act expected of a person becomes
compulsory, it becomes correspondingly irksome."56 In his writings,
Greeley had emphasized the social bases of family relations. Stanton,
Andrews, and Owen, by contrast, sought to establish marriage as an
affective relationship based on a romantic love that was voluntary,

ephemeral, spontaneous, and unresponsive to legal coercion. They

looked to the "highest good of the individual. It is the inalienable right
of all to be happy. It is the highest duty to seek those conditions in
life, those surroundings, which may develop what is noblest and best."57
Marriage was not a legal bond or social duty, but an affective relationship

of mutual love and kindness, "intended by God for the greater freedom
and happiness of both parties."58 Downplaying its physical aspect,
divorce reformers suggested that "It is not mere physical infidelity but
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that adultery of the heart which quenches conjugal love; thus destroying

that which, far more justly than your cohabitation till death, may be
regarded as 'the essence of marriage.'"59 By this standard, marriage
"fulfills God's intentions so long as the domestic home is the abode of
purity, of noble sentiment, of kindness...." By this standard, too, a

marriage is broken not just by catastrophic upheaval, but when it
becomes "the daily cause of grievous words and heartless deeds-of
anger, strife, selfishness, cruelty, ruffianism."60

Clearly, a marital relation that existed only through the rigor of the
law and not the mutual love and ongoing consent of the parties was
not conducive to the highest human development, and the furthering
of happiness and human growth became the new standard by which
social and political functions were judged. Utilitarianism combined
with the developing creed of liberal Protestantism to produce a new
rationale for institutions from the state down to the family. It was to

accommodate this new vision of the family as constituted by the
ongoing consent of the parties rather than by legal forms that Stanton

sought to recast the marriage bond to eliminate any element of

irrevocability or coercion from outside. She denied that marriage vows
were anything but a voluntary, temporary mutual agreement for the
benefit of both. Citing the "weakness and blindness" that led human

beings to make poor decisions in the choice of business partners,
legislators, teachers, and other public officers, she urged that the far

graver matrimonial bond should be a "contract-no more perpetual
than either or all of the former."61 By 1870, Stanton declared that in
the Protestant world the question was no longer whether marriage was
a sacrament or a contract, but, as a contract, for what reasons it might
be dissolved.62

Stanton envisioned the family as reforming along the lines of the
republican state: it would consist of free and independent individuals,
voluntarily contracting for a corporate existence during the pleasure of
the parties, each protected in its own autonomy by inalienable individual
rights.63 Many other feminists, though, felt the limitations inherent in

the wholesale adoption of the personal liberty model of social change.
The strict dichotomy between slavery and freedom worked to create a
scheme of personal rights that could not accommodate the genuine

physical and emotional dependencies of family relations. Stanton's
rhetoric often pitted woman's right to herself against intimate demands

pictured only as cloying and confining. For Stanton, "a single life of
self-reliance, dignity, individual growth and development, is more sacred

than a relation that subjects (woman) body and soul, to the will of

another."64
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Many feminists and reformers from across the spectrum resisted as
pernicious Stanton's attempts to apply a commercial theory of contract
to the marriage relation. Opponents of liberal divorce founded their
arguments on the importance of the ideal, if not always the reality, of
marriage as a permanent institution. For them, Stanton's use of contract

theory provided a model of family relations that neither worked

realistically to redress inequality, nor acknowledged the durability and
permanence of parental or marital ties.
Religious precepts helped to shape these differing visions. Feminists
like Antoinette Brown Blackwell resisted Stanton's contract theory,
maintaining instead a covenantal view of marriage. Blackwell adopted
a Christian ideal of marriage, not through an unthinking adherence to

scriptural commands and injunctions, but through a belief in the
doctrines of salvation, redemption, perfectionism, and atonement.
Stanton offered human incompetence and frequent errors in choosing
business partners, teachers, and other important contacts as evidence
that the ability to dissolve such relations should always exist and in
marriage, more so, since mistakes were frequent and costly. Blackwell
too acknowledged problems within marriage, but her faith in marriage
as a relation encompassed the "growth and assimilation of the parties"
to each other and the smoothing out of differences over time that only
the permanence of marriage would promote. The nature of moral life
required that human beings maintain, if not the attraction and affection

of their salad days, at least the "devotion to the good of another, and
especially to the good of the sinful and guilty, [which] like all disinterestedness, must redound to the highest good of its author... obedient

to the highest laws of benevolence."65 A husband's irresponsibility
provided the opportunity for a wifely redemptive intervention, for as

a Christian she could "never enjoy peace or rest until [she had]...

thus reclaimed him and brought him out of his sins ... as [she] would
work to save [her] children, brothers, sister, and the whole human
family."66

Blackwell saw marriage not as a "tie" as Stanton had suggested, with
the inbuilt possibility of untying, but as a "relation," which once formed

can never be destroyed: one can "untie" but not unrelate.67 For her, it
was a critical, defining element of human nature that individuals could
form a marriage relation through a single act of will that had permanent

consequences. She frequently made analogies between marriage and
biological ties, asking, "Can the mother ever destroy the relation which

exists between herself and the child? Can the father annul the relation

which exists between himself and the child? Then, can the father and
mother annul the relation which exists between themselves, the parents
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of the child? It cannot be."68 Like Greeley, Blackwell believed that
marriage by its nature continued for the lives of the spouses. Unlike

him, she did not base her claim directly in social good, but in an
imperative for the moral development of the individual. For her, the
extraordinary characteristic of human love was the way in which it
approximated divine love, in that it outlasted the span of human life.
By contrast, in Stanton's vision of romantic love, individual satisfaction described the nature of the bond. She derided the concept of
Christian love in marriage, denying that husband and wife could ever
act as saviors to each other. While her critics charged that love was a

compound of "forebearance, patience, forgiveness, endurance," she
eschewed these virtues, seeing marriage not as a process, a "soul
perfecting itself through trial," but as a spontaneous emotional reaction.

Stanton denied that love was an act of will, or that it could be
deliberately prolonged by the parties once the fragile bloom was gone.69

Blackwell and Stanton differed fundamentally in their understanding
of the connection generated in marriage. Stanton perceived marriage
as a tie susceptible to dissolution at will. Blackwell described marriage
as a relation whose very formation, although voluntary, entailed a
permanent bond. For feminists such as Jane Croly, who questioned
such "connective" definitions of marriage, the ties of circumstance and
relation were inevitable, the definition of life itself, without which it
would be impoverished.
We are tied from the moment we enter the world, and are probably the
better and happier for it, though we may rebel against it. We are actual
slaves to circumstances, which preceded our births, which enclosed us
in a skin, which governed our height, our color, our shape, our strength
or weakness, and over which we had not the least control. We are tied
after birth to certain natural laws, which we very imperfectly understand,
and of which we can only see the results. We are tied with cords woven
by time itself to the habits and traditions which have preceded us; and
more strongly still are we tied by our instincts and desires which, blind
and unreasoning as they are, we are compelled to obey.... We see, then,
there is very little of the freedom of which we boast so much in the

matter.70

Denying the theory of radical individual and bodily autonomy so
important to Stanton, Croly saw interdependence: "as parts of one
great body, we are all dependent upon and owe duties to each other."7'
What autonomy does an arm have, or a foot? For Croly, a body isolated
was a body devalued; such a fiction flew in the face of the authentic
conditions of life.

Stanton's refusal to acknowledge any social function of the family,
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or any legitimate church or state interest in regulating it, tended toward

the complete privatization of the family, marking that area off as
"personal" and impervious to regulation, for better or worse.72 The
family became an isolated sphere, governed by a contractual ideal.
Although Stanton's vision of the family did not go uncontested by her
contemporaries, it is largely this view of family law that has prevailed
in courts and legislatures today.
Protectionism and Liberalism

Despite the resistance to Stanton's stand on divorce both from within
the movement and without, her influence proved far greater than a
polling of her opponents might suggest. Divorce itself remained controversial, but pro-divorce arguments were a critical piece of the far
broader liberal rights theory of which Stanton was a chief architect.
Political savvy kept her from openly declaring herself a free lover, but
a common store of ideas with a free love stamp became the basis of
Stanton's political creed.73 Indeed, in one sense self-ownership-construed also as self-respect-came to replace more traditional "virtue"
in the feminist canon as the qualification for citizenship, through the
claim that all wise and virtuous government rested on the foundation
of a citizenry with a strong sense of individual mastery.74 Without these,

political rights were meaningless, for
if you go to a southern plantation and speak to a slave of his right to
property, to the elective franchise, to a thorough education, his response
will be a vacant stare... the great idea of his right to himself, of his
personal dignity, must first take possession of his soul, and then he will
demand equality in everything.... I repeat, the center and circumference
of woman's rights is just what the slave's are. Personal freedom is the
first right to be proclaimed, that does not and cannot belong to the

relation of wife.75

The very concept of "right," then, was predicated on a world where
those rights were to be exercised free of the legal and social restraints
imposed by obligation to others. Liberal feminists sought to make the
absolute right to oneself the basis for the exercise of rights within the
state, and their rhetoric on personal rights and rights within the family

became the basis of their model for the exercise of political rights.76
For Stanton, then, questions of family governance were measured by
the same yardstick as questions about the role of the citizen in society

and in the state.

In addition to applying the forms of contract to marriage, divorce
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reformers sought to tighten the correspondence between rights in the
family and the civil realm by using constant analogies from other areas
of law and public policy, which they brought to bear on the law of the
family as well. To this end, Stanton, like Andrews and Owen, drew on

analogies from liberal economic theory, free labor and free trade
ideology, and the constitutional guarantees of freedom of conscience
and separation of church and state to sketch in a new model of family
law. Sensing a deep intellectual kinship, all three conflated such issues
as free divorce, free love, free labor, free contract, and free trade.77
Stanton herself confirmed the connection between doctrines with the

story of a man who refused Graham bread, "for he had noticed that
if anybody began with bran bread, he was sure to end with infidelity"a somewhat eccentric formulation of a great progressive truth.78 Their
opponent Horace Greeley had little trouble recognizing these reformers'
organic approach. He lumped free traders, usurers, tax dodgers, and
advocates of easy divorce together in one morally bankrupt category,
claiming that "the free trade sophistry respecting marriage is on every
libertine's tongue."79 Andrews, for his part, commended Greeley, saying

"You rightly refer free trade, freedom of the finances, freedom from
state systems of religion and education, and freedom of the love relation,

to one and the same principle, and that principle you recognize as the
spirit of the age."80 Both sides, then, recognized that reformers were
working to make the regulation of families of a piece with broader
principles at work in areas of public and private commercial law. At
heart, the problem in all areas was the same: to secure the removal of
an external structure of laws to allow natural governing forces to assert
themselves.

Although his proposals and his understanding of women's sexual
subordination were radical for his day (and perhaps for ours), Andrews's
political theory embodied strong liberal tendencies through his belief

in the irresistable power of an underlying order and the need to

eliminate all external regulation to allow that order to work unimpeded,
a philosophy to which Stanton subscribed as well. A devoted disciple
of Fourier, ("who really was about the most remarkable genius who
has yet lived"), Andrews subscribed to Fourier's "grand discovery that
Attraction, which Newton discovered to be the law and the regulation

of the motions of material bodies, is equally the law and the God-

intended regulation of the whole affectional and social sphere in human
affairs."81 When the artificial restraints of law and custom were removed,

the powerful force of Attraction would insure that human affairs were
self-regulating, both in the economic and in the more important erotic
world. Andrews saw the progress toward a fully self-regulating world
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as inevitable: "Freedom in love is the last attainment of the progressive

civilized world. It is the culminating point toward which all other
reforms tend. The system of restriction or arbitrary order in which the

world was bound for ages is gradually dissolving."82
Andrews and Stanton also analogized religious tolerance to liberal
(non-regulatory) family laws, seeking to extend the established principles

of freedom of conscience and of theological persuasion to cover
unorthodox sexual relations as well. Andrews poked fun at one of his
critics, suggesting that no "doubt... he, too, is honest in his statement
of the doctrine of religious freedom, and that he would, in practice,
recognize my right to live with three women, if my conscience approved,

as readily and heartily as he would contend for the rights to read the

Protestant Bible at Florence."83 Andrews claimed for himself "no better

right to determine what is moral or proper for you to DO than... to
determine what it is religious for you to BELIEVE," and likened such
an attempt to the burnings at Smithfield. Any effort to regulate the
moral lives of others through the mechanism of the state, Andrews
suggested, would always end in the resort to such time-dishonored
sanctions as "public odium, the prison, the gibbet, the hemlock, or the
cross"-sanctions that may punish or suppress but never succeed in
creating a truly harmonious order.84 Stanton heartily concurred that
the rigid enforcement of the Christian ideal of lifelong monogamous
marriage represented undue influence by church and state in the private
lives of individuals.

Stanton's own repeated advocacy of free labor, free trade, and free
currency shows that she extended her belief in deregulation to the
economy; and that there was more than a superficial affinity between
her views on marriage, her philosophy of government, and classic
liberal notions of laissez-faire.85 Indeed, reformers' efforts to meld those

elements together shows a more complex face of liberalism than we

usually see. Liberal theory is often portrayed as an amalgam of

pessimism and human greed, but neither of these could account for
the grip it took on American ideology. Stanton's liberalism was based
firmly in a liberal Protestant creed that celebrated the innate goodness

of human nature and its ability to find its own right course once

external regulation was lifted. Despite her anticlericalism, Stanton was
a child of the Second Great Awakening and subscribed to its tenets on
the efficacy of human will.86 The Christian perfectionism of the ante-

bellum period-perfection of the soul-translated for many in the

post-war period into a perfection of the life and of the work-human
happiness. Although their interests were not the same, liberal reformers
made common cause with business interests on the best method of
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securing change of any sort: deregulation. Nineteenth-century liberalism, then, was not a single strand, but a complex weave of economic,
political, and religious philosophies, and it was much the stronger for
it.

The issue of protection had also been at stake in the wrangling that
went on among Andrews, Owen, and Greeley in the decade before the
Civil War. As an anarchist, Andrews was a strong proponent of selfgovernment or self-sovereignty-the idea that any authority exercised
by one human being over another interposed itself illegitimately between

the individual and God's governance-a belief shared by abolitionists
and feminists as well. In the context of free love, this concept expressed

itself most radically in terms of the freeing of the body from any
obligations imposed from without. A chief architect of the free lovers'
creed of the absolute right of the individual to bodily mastery and

integrity, that independence became for Andrews the single most
important measure of social health, while the physical subjugation of
women in American society was a prime indicator of its diseased state.

Like Stanton, he saw bodily obligations as evidence of an ancient

serfdom repugnant to enlightened minds. Andrews saw himself as a
revolutionary fighting against "the defenders of slavery, and the fastid-

ious aristocratic classes everywhere," as well as against all vestiges of
the feudal structure of hierarchy, tenures, and paternalism, which placed,

protected, and imprisoned the individual.
Stanton's composite writings and pronouncements tended toward
the disaggregation of the family as well, an outcome she found personally, socially, and politically desirable. Her philosophy of marriage
emphasized the aspect of individual development, and the severing of
obligatory ties and dependencies contributed to this.87 Socially as well,

Stanton was convinced that only the removal of all restriction on
women-domestic, civil, and physical-could bring them into a
position of full equality. Politically, she classed the patriarchal family

with "despotic governments (and) infallible churches.... Every new
step in civilization tends to individual awareness, dignity, responsibility,

alike in the church, the state, and the home."88 Clearly, the democratic
reorganization of the family required that each individual be accorded
full status and rights: Stanton denied that the "representative" theory
of the family as a "unit" was acceptable. Government should deal with

individuals, not with families, or with certain of its members as

representatives of others.89

Inherent in the push for the disaggregation of the family was the
recognition that, like slavery or the harem, the protection offered by
family membership was often at the price of liberty. For slaves, being
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"'a part of the family'" had "protected" them from the onus of
taxation, as well as denying them a civil voice: leaving the "family"
changed both.90 Any physical obligation that owed its existence to a
code or rule was similarly discredited: just as Horace Greeley denounced
"the free trade sophistry respecting marriage," the liberal feminists
equated the safety of marriage with the harem, paternalism, and slavery,

claiming "protection is the leech that preys upon the heart of liberty."
"Protectors" take on a sarcastic significance in Stanton's work as those
who rape and seduce women.9'
In fact, discussions of the marriage question both within and without
organized feminism also centered on another set of issues-economic
protection and the consequences of easy divorce for wives and mothers.
In 1860, Stanton's and Blackwell's optimistic beliefs in the potential

for the liberated and energetic woman to achieve economic parity
allowed both to ignore the problem of dependence.9 A decade later,
some feminists were more skeptical. Stanton's brash and public advocacy of divorce was an irritant that contributed to the estrangement
of the New York and Boston feminist groups. Although Lucy Stone
and Henry B. Blackwell almost certainly agreed with Stanton in private,
they feared that her public stance would taint the quest for the ballot
and lose the suffrage movement crucial support. They steadfastly refused

to acknowledge the link between civil and domestic inequality, naively
arguing that, once the lack of political rights for women had been

redressed, relations between the sexes would right themselves as a
natural consequence.

At the same time, writers for the Woman's Journal, the paper of the
American Woman Suffrage Association (AWSA), had another complaint
to make: They found Stanton's rhetoric naive and disingenuous in its
assumption that free divorce would primarily benefit women. How
many mothers, under the circumstances, could afford to sweep grandly
out and set up housekeeping on their own? Stone and her followers

intimated that "freedom" for a divorced mother of six should be known

as its other names, immiseration and abandonment. For the suffragists
of the AWSA, divorce was at best an unfortunate necessity in cases of
chronic spousal abuse, but free divorce in Stanton's terms represented
"practically, freedom of unworthy men to leave their wives and children

to starve, while it could not give similar freedom to mothers to leave
their children."93 Neither wing of the suffrage movement showed any
abiding sensitivity to the problems of working class women, the AWSA
less than Stanton's group. The Boston contingent, though, grasped that
the "right" of divorce must be seen in light of prevailing economic
conditions, where "a wife with children, who has lost the help of her
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husband, has undertaken a contest with fortune against heavy odds."94
The imperative of self-sovereignty, then, left little room for financial,
physical, or emotional obligation of any kind. As Andrews had earlier
announced, "The great lesson for the world is that human beings do
not need to be taken care of What they do need is such conditions of
justice and friendly cooperation that they can take care of themselves."
Stanton concurred that the dangers of protectionism far outweighed
the problems of poverty.95

Conclusion

The adoption of the slavery metaphor for marriage-with its reflexive
counter, freedom-had weighty consequences for the development of

feminist thought in America. It gave feminists an immediate and
powerful concept and a language of personal independence that reson-

ated in the dominant culture. It also carried a transformative vision of

equality. There were several feminist traditions in the nineteenth century,
but it is this vision of liberation that the woman's movement of the

mid-twentieth century has drawn on for support and sustenance. The
ideal of personal freedom has proven durable as a spark to political
action that addresses women's deepest concerns. More than a century
later, well after political "equality" was established by the Nineteenth

Amendment, the idea of escape from bondage fueled a women's

movement that has changed the shape of American social life.
At the same time, the process of defining rights, occurring both
within feminism and in the larger political culture, through the paradigm

of slavery and freedom, transformed their meaning. In Stanton's liberal
view, shaped by her post-Civil War contractual view of marriage, rights
originated in the private sphere, not within the context of social or
public life. The Revolution argued that the assertion of self-ownership
for women must become "the paramount and controlling influence of
her life, for individual freedom of choice is the cornerstone of individual
responsibility, and all virtue and wise government must rest on this
foundation." Only then, when responsible alone to God and herself,
she shall possess the right to life and liberty, she will occupy a position
in which she will logically be capable of becoming a Beneficent Power."96
Departing from the antebellum formulaton that rights were both the
offspring and the agent of performing duties, Stanton insisted that
rights were paramount and antecedent to duties. The earlier notion
that the perfection of individual rights was the only means of protecting
the rights of the community gave way to language that pitted the
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individual against the community: Stanton concluded that "the best
interests of a community can never require the sacrifice of one innocent

being, of one sacred right."97
The elevation of the individual right to a position of absolute authority
created a philosophical framework in which it was easiest to recognize
the negative right, the right to be free from something, where the
balancing of rights through the recognition of binding claims by one
person on another was made, if not impossible, at least conceptually
dubious. Sarah Norton, a contributor to Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly,

spoke for much of nineteenth-century feminism-indeed, much of

nineteenth-century liberalism -when she asked, "wherein, then consists
the value of a right that cannot be appropriated at the option of the

individual possessing it? or how much of the value or usefulness
remains, if it is to be subject to the control of some greater right?"98
Liberal feminists, pushing the argument that "we do not live by
bread alone," were compelled to downgrade the importance of financial
"security" in marriage, in order to establish it as an affective relationship

between equals.99 This emphasis hindered meaningful discussion among
Stantonians about another set of issues-economic protection and the
consequences of easy divorce for wives and mothers. Ultimately, despite
her quick sympathy with the oppressed of all sorts, Stanton's preoccupation with individual freedom prevented her from developing a
coherent class-based theory that invoked systematic legal or institutional

remedies to women's position in marriage. Stanton, throughout her
life, maintained a belief in the primacy of change at the personal level.

She judged civil perfection to be the result of the perfection of

individuals, a belief that after the war was translated into a defense of
individual rights. Stanton suggested that women's rise should follow
the projected path of the slave: "end all this talk of class legislation,
bury the Negro in the citizen, and claim the suffrage for all men and
women." She rejected any argument based on the "rights of races,"
and accepted as the only rationale for reform the slave's "manhood;
his individual, inalienable right to freedom and equality; and thus...
woman's case today."'??
Such an idealistic response to the practical problems of racism and
sexism has left a mixed legacy for twentieth-century feminists. Ultimately, Stanton's theories, by undermining the bonds between individ-

uals within the family and by placing the source of rights in this

deregulated private sphere, may have made it more difficult to assert
group rights in the larger social setting. The contractual theory of liberal

individualism has never proven a satisfactory mediator of family
relations, nor has the extension of that theory into the civil sphere
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created a basis for the assumption by the state of family obligationsday care, medical care for children, parental leave-that could genuinely change the lives of working women.
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